Leaking Secrets from Air-Gap Computers by Spelling Radio Signals from RAM (2024)
================================================================================

View PDF HTML (experimental) Abstract:Air-gapped systems are physically separated from external networks, including the Internet. This isolation is achieved by keeping the air-gap computers disconnected from wired or wireless networks, preventing direct or remote communication with other devices or networks. Air-gap measures may be used in sensitive environments where security and isolation are critical to prevent private and confidential information leakage. In this paper, we present an attack allowing adversaries to leak information from air-gapped computers. We show that malware on a compromised computer can generate radio signals from memory buses (RAM). Using software-generated radio signals, malware can encode sensitive information such as files, images, keylogging, biometric information, and encryption keys. With software-defined radio (SDR) hardware, and a simple off-the-shelf antenna, an attacker can intercept transmitted raw radio signals from a distance. The signals can then be decoded and translated back into binary information. We discuss the design and implementation and present related work and evaluation results. This paper presents fast modification methods to leak data from air-gapped computers at 1000 bits per second. Finally, we propose countermeasures to mitigate this out-of-band air-gap threat. Comments: Version of this work accepted to Nordic Conference on Secure IT Systems, 2023 Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2409.02292 [cs.CR] (or arXiv:2409.02292v1 [cs.CR] for this version) https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2409.02292 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite Submission history From: Mordechai Guri [view email] [v1] Tue, 3 Sep 2024 21:06:04 UTC (18,145 KB)

Resources
View PDF: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2409.02292
HTML (experimental): https://arxiv.org/html/2409.02292v1